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DEFINING TERRORISM: ONE SIZE FITS ALL?  
INTRODUCTION 
Forthcoming, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
Alan Greene 
Lecturer in Law, Durham Law School 
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'The UK uses the same legal definition for every situation in which 'terrorism' is a 
legally-relevant category.1 This definition, in s. 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, is vague, 
broad, and widely criticised by experts, courts and academics. Yet the decision to 
take a ‘one-size fits all’ approach to defining terrorism was taken without much 
consideration of alternatives and there has been little appetite for questioning this 
approach since. In this article I outline the wide-ranging difficulties with both the 
current definition as it stands and the notion of a single definition for terrorism that 
can be applied across multiple, highly varied, legal contexts. Preferable, I argue, is a 
multi-definitional approach to the concept of terrorism in legal terms, with the 
definition used being determined by the powers exercisable in respect of it. This 
would work as a sliding scale: the more intrusive, repressive and oppressive the 
powers the narrower the definition. Such an approach is entirely consistent with the 
idea that the greater the exercise of state power the clearer, tighter and more limited 
the definition that empowers the state should be. This is, as Lord Bingham has 
observed, key to limiting discretion and thus maintaining the rule of law and stands 
in sharp contrast to the status quo.2  
This article commences by questioning the need to legally define terrorism in the 
first instance, distinguishing between the descriptive definitions of the social 
sciences and the prescriptive exercise that the law undertakes. While, a distinction 
will also be made between domestic and international requirements for a single legal 
definition, it shall be argued that these two spheres are not wholly severable from 
                                                 
1 With the one narrow exception of the Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993 which is specifically 
for the purposes of defining terrorism for insurance claims. S 2(2) of the Act defines terrorism as: ‘acts 
of persons acting on behalf of, or in connection with, any organisation which carries out activities 
directed towards the overthrowing or influencing, by force or violence, of Her Majesty's government 
in the United Kingdom or any other government de jure or de facto.’ 
2 See Tom Bingham, The Rule of Law (London: Penguin, 2011) Ch 4. 
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each other, notwithstanding the fact that the geo-political factors making the quest 
for an internationally agreed definition of terrorism almost impossible do not 
necessarily play out in national politics. A common theme recurring in these various 
disciplines regarding the definition of terrorism is the key role that the labeller plays 
in identifying who or what is a terrorist and the delegitimising effect that this 
categorisation has. An important issue related to this is the idea that by legally 
defining terrorism, the use of the term can be controlled.  
Using the UK definition of terrorism as a case study, Part II argues that a single 
definitional approach to terrorism results in a ‘race to the bottom’, requiring the 
broadest possible definition in order to accommodate every possible scenario. This, 
in turn, confers extensive discretion on decision-makers which is applied in an 
inconsistent and unclear manner, undermining the principle of legality as reflected 
in British constitutional law, and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). This problem is further exaggerated by the increasing application of this 
definition of terrorism overseas in non-international armed conflicts and the issue of 
British citizens engaging in terrorist activities overseas returning to the UK.3  
In light of this, Part III advances an argument in favour of a multi-definitional 
approach to the concept of terrorism. Concerns that this approach would amount to 
an expression of inconsistency or would reduce law’s ability to control the use of the 
term ‘terrorism’ are addressed in Part IV. These concerns over-state the role that law 
plays in framing political debates, ignoring the powerful political and social forces 
that instead shape public perceptions of what constitutes terrorism.  
I: DEFINING TERRORISM  
The quest for a satisfactory definition of terrorism, described by Nicholas J Perry as 
the search for the ‘Holy Grail’, is one pursued by law and various other branches of 
the social sciences.4 To define terrorism, however, assumes, that such a phenomenon 
                                                 
3 David Anderson, ‘The Terrorism Acts in 2014: Report of the Independent Reviewer on the Operation 
of the Terrorism Act 2000 and Part I of the Terrorism Act 2006’ (September 2015) Available at: < 
https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Terrorism-
Acts-Report-2015-Print-version.pdf> (accessed 1 April 2016) 2. 
4 Nicholas J Perry, ‘The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many 
Grails’ (2004) 30(2) Journal of Legislation 249. 
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exists. As a concept, terrorism has oscillated in meaning, reflecting ideas 
contextually specific to the time-period and location to which it is being applied. 
Many etymological studies of the origins of terrorism trace the term back to the 
aftermath of the French Revolution and Maximilien Robespierre’s ‘reign of terror’ 
between 1792 and 1794.5 The Oxford English Dictionary first mentions the word 
‘terrorism’ in 1795, shortly after this violent period and today, the Oxford English 
Dictionary still starts its definition of terrorism with this ‘at once too literal and too 
historical’ definition.6 As a result, this definition is, according to Bruce Hoffmann, 
not ‘of much use’ when trying to understand the concept of terrorism.7 Terrorism 
has deviated from this original meaning of state-sponsored violence designed to 
induce fear and terror in order to control and dominate an otherwise anarchical 
society, to describe the exact opposite: political violence directed against the state. In 
the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, terrorism was often used to refer to anarchists, 
particularly following the assassination of US President William McKinley in 1901 
by Leon Czolgosz — a self-confessed anarchist.8 At the same time in Europe, 
terrorism was gaining its connection with ‘freedom-fighters’ as a result of renewed 
struggles for Irish independence from Britain using tactics such as bombings, 
assassination techniques and guerrilla warfare.9 This evolution from state-sponsored 
to state-targeted terrorism was not linear, however; in the 1930s, terrorism again 
became associated with state-sponsored violence due to the rise of violent, 
authoritarian regimes in Italy, Spain, and Nazi Germany.10 Following the end of 
World War II and the decline of the European empires, terrorism again became 
linked with freedom fighters and the violent methods used by various anti-
colonialist groups seeking self-determination.11 Today, these two issues of whether 
states can commit terrorism, and whether one can distinguish the terrorist from the 
freedom-fighter struggling against an oppressive regime are the fundamental 
                                                 
5 Bruce Hoffmann, Inside Terrorism: Revised and Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2006) 2. 
6 Conor Gearty, The Future of Terrorism (London: Phoenix, 1997) 5. 
7 Hoffmann (n 5).  
8 ibid 7. 
9 ibid 8-9. 
10 ibid 14. 
11 ibid 16. 
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problems afflicting attempts to provide a definition of terrorism in international 
law.12 
Terrorism: A Social Construct 
Terrorism therefore is a social construct, its meaning shaped by the subjective 
perspectives of the categoriser.13 These in turn are influenced by the society and 
circumstances in which the categoriser finds themselves in, varying upon the 
historical and political context in which they live. Consequently, attempts to 
understand terrorism have spawned a vast array of different methodologies, 
paradigms, and branches of knowledge. Certain branches of ‘terrorism studies’ may 
be conceptualised as cultural anthropology, viewing ‘terrorists’ as natives that need 
to be studied.14 Under this approach, the subject of study is the terrorist actor. 
Contrasting approaches to understanding terrorism instead train their lens upon 
those labelling terrorists as such. These ‘critical terrorism studies’ emphasise the 
subjective nature of terrorism and seek to unveil the power dynamics at play in 
constructing these labels.15 Discourse-centred terrorism studies instead look not 
necessarily at the categoriser or the categorised, but at the discourse surrounding 
terrorism to reveal the nature of terrorism.16 This constructivist approach 
conceptualises terrorism as possessing certain objective criteria; however, it also 
acknowledges that there are powerful subjective forces at play in constructing this 
object.17 
The need for a definition of terrorism also varies according to the different fields 
undertaking the quest. Sociologists and criminologists require one in order to define 
the parameters of that which they study.18 Theirs is, for the most part, a descriptive 
endeavour. Despite this need, however, a famous 1988 survey found over 100 
                                                 
12 text to n 23 below. 
13 R.Jackson, L.Jarvis, J. Gunning and M. Breen Smyth, Terrorism — a critical introduction (New York: 
Palgrave Mac Millan, 2011) 164; D. Anderson, ‘Shielding the Compass’ (2013) 3 EHRLR 233, 240. 
14 Rainer Hülsse and Alexander Spencer, ‘The Metaphor of Terror: Terrorism Studies and the 
Constructivist Turn’ (2008) 39(6) Security Dialogue 571, 573.  
15 ibid 575. 
16 ibid 575-578. 
17 ibid. 
18 See Alex Schmid and Albert J Jongman, Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, 
Data Bases, Theories and Literature (New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1988) Ch 1. 
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definitions used by terrorism researchers in the literature.19 This has been described 
as ‘a perverse situation where a great number of scholars are studying a 
phenomenon, the essence of which they have… agreed to disagree upon’.20 Law, 
however, is not merely a descriptive exercise but is predominately a prescriptive 
(and indeed a proscriptive) exercise. The normative factors that accompany this 
prescriptive exercise are ones which the sociologist may not necessarily have to 
confront.21 Relatedly, terrorist studies that scrutinise the power structures at play in 
the labelling of an event or individual as ‘terrorist’, reveal that terrorism is a 
pejorative term, loaded with condemnation that delegitimises the political motive 
that the deed seeks to propagate.22 This ‘labelling’ is of paramount importance when 
understanding terrorism as a legal construct.  
Terrorism as a Legal Construct 
Much has been written on the difficulties surrounding a legal definition of terrorism; 
however, considerably less attention has been devoted on why there is a need to 
define terrorism in law in the first instance. The literature that does exist on this 
question tends to focus on debates in international law. Jörg Friedrichs’ account of 
attempts to define terrorism at international law illustrates two major hurdles that 
have, to date, stumped this quest.23 Firstly, states fundamentally disagree as to the 
distinction between freedom fighters and terrorists.24 Secondly, states disagree as to 
whether a definition of terrorism in international law should cover state acts or not.25 
These differences are politically and ideologically driven, with a state’s perspective 
on the issue predicated by its own self-interests. Thus the UK in the past insisted on 
no distinction between terrorist and freedom fighter due to its struggles with the 
                                                 
19 Ibid. 
20 D Brannan, P Esler and T Strindberg, ‘Talking to “terrorists” towards an independent analytical 
framework for the study of violent substate activism’ (2001) 24 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 3, 11 
; Lisa Stampnitzky, Disciplining Terror: How Experts Invented “Terrorism” (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 5. 
21 Jessie Blackbourn, Fergal Davis and Natasha C. Taylor, ‘Academic Consensus and Legislative 
Definitions of Terrorism: Applying Schmid and Jongman’ (2013) 34(3) Statute Law Review 239, 255. 
22 Hoffmann (n 5) 23; AP Schmidt, ‘The Definition of Terrorism’ in AP Schmid (ed) The Routledge 
Handbook of Terrorism Research (London: Routledge, 2011) 39-40. 
23 Jörg Friedrichs, ‘Defining the International Public Enemy: The Political Struggle Behind the Legal 
Debate on International Terrorism’ (2006) 19 Leiden Journal of International Law 69, 76. 
24 ibid 72-76. 
25 Ibid 76-77. 
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Irish Republication Army (IRA).26 Arab states took the opposite stance in defence of 
Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation.27 A number of Arab states may, however, 
have changed their stance in the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’ and attempts — both 
successful and unsuccessful — to usher in internal regime change by various 
opposition groups.  
International law has instead developed in a piecemeal manner, with treaties based 
upon specific crimes considered to be indicative of terrorism — e.g. plane hijacking 
and hostage taking.28 While lacking definitions of terrorism, this approach would be 
similar to a multi-definitional approach or ‘inductive’ approach to terrorism 
whereby the definition used is particular to the power or problem identified.29 The 
inductive approach does not commence with a broad hypothesis, but instead 
constructs its hypothesis based on observations. This hypothesis is then assessed 
against reality for accuracy. An inductive approach to defining terrorism thus does 
not necessarily seek to provide a universal definition covering all instances but 
instead defines terrorism to only cover specific situations that it can accommodate.30 
An inductive approach therefore can consist of multiple separate definitions 
applicable to distinct situations.31 While an inductive approach resulting in multiple 
definitions of terrorism may be of little use to the social scientist who is seeking to 
define the parameters of that which they are studying, it may nevertheless be the 
case that it still has a function in the prescriptive and proscriptive function of the 
law. 
In contrast to the inductive approach, the deductive approach starts out with a 
general definition of terrorism and applies this to numerous different 
                                                 
26 Ibid 80. 
27 Ibid 72-73. See also, Rémi Brulin, ‘Defining “Terrorism”: The 1972 General Assembly debates on 
“international terrorism” and their coverage by the New York Times’ in Banu Baybars-Hawks and 
Lemi Baruh (eds), If It Was Not for Terrorism: Crisis, Compromise, and Elite Discourse in the Age of War on 
Terror (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing 2011) 12. 
28 Geoffrey Levitt, ‘Is “Terrorism” Worth Defining?’ (1986) 13(1) Ohio Northern University Law 
Review 97,101; The European Union has also has a single definition of terrorism although the UK has 
adopted out of this. See Council Framework Decision 2002/475 on Combating Terrorism. 
29 ibid 97. 
30 ibid, 109. 
31 ibid 97. 
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circumstances.32 For a deductive reasoning to operate effectively, the initial 
hypothesis must be correct, and, indeed it must be agreed upon in the first instance 
and it is this hurdle that international law has not yet managed to cross. A deductive 
approach would be expected to produce a single definition of terrorism.  
A number of different arguments have been put forward as to why a single 
definition of terrorism is preferable to a multi-definitional approach. Christian 
Walter, for example, argues that clarity and certainty are key justifications for a 
single legal definition of terrorism: 
The main reason for slightly different definitions is not a decision on the purpose by 
the legislator, but rather the adoption of different measures at different times and a 
corresponding lack of co-ordination. For the purpose of clarity and legal certainty it 
would be desirable to adopt as much as possible a single definition of “terrorism” 
within any given legal order.33  
A similar argument in the international context is put forward by Ben Golder and 
George Williams who argue that as ‘terrorism’ has entered the political discourse, 
the law is to keep pace with this discussion by reflecting our current understanding 
of terrorism and ‘crystallising it in a form consistent with rule of law principles’.34 
Also referring to the international debate, Alex Schmid argues that a single 
definition would avoid the ‘defeatist’ position that one man’s terrorist is another 
man’s freedom fighter, thus moving the discourse into an area where there is 
international agreement.35 Geoffrey Levitt argues that on a practical level, a single 
definition is more convenient, neater, and more efficient36 However, Levitt also 
                                                 
32 ibid 97. 
33 Christian Walter, ‘Defining Terrorism in National and International Law’ (Paper presented at the 
Max Planck Society Conference on Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law, 
Heidelberg, 24 January 2003) < 
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/bibliography/Biblio_Terr_Def_Walter_2003.pdf > (accessed 7 April 
2016) 10. 
See e.g. Fiona de Londras, ‘Terrorism as an International Crime’ in W Schabas and N Bernaz, 
‘Routledge International Book of Criminal Law’ (London: Routledge, 2010) 167,167; 
34 Ben Golder and George Williams, ‘What is “Terrorism” Problems of a Legal Definition’ (2004) 27(2) 
UNSW Law Journal 270, 288.  
35 See Alex P Schmid, ‘The Response Problem as a Definition Problem’ (1992) 4(4) Terrorism and 
Political Violence 7. 
36 Levitt (n 28) 110. 
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suggests that this practical reason alone is not sufficient to justify a deductive 
approach to defining terrorism. Furthermore, Levitt concedes that ‘it may also be 
possible to employ a multi-definitional approach in a way that is convenient, neat, 
and efficient.’37 Levitt instead concludes that it is the moral-political benefits of a 
single definition of terrorism that is the true reason that underlies such an approach, 
echoing the concerns of RR Baxter that there is no real necessity for a single 
‘deductive’ definition of terrorism.38 Referring to the quest for a single definition of 
terrorism in international law as distinct from a domestic legal system, Levitt argues 
that: 
A multilateral anti-terrorism legal instrument based on a generic definition of 
terrorism would in effect put the official international seal of disapproval on the 
whole range of violent political behaviour, with a moral emphasis that the facially 
apolitical inductive approach lacks. Those who engage in such behaviour would be 
effectively branded as international outlaws.39  
While Levitt is referring to efforts to define terrorism in an international context, the 
advantages to be gained from a single definitional approach are nevertheless 
transposable into the domestic context: the political benefit to be gained from having 
such a delegitimising label that is ‘terrorism’ at the disposal of the government. 
Caleb Carr also agrees with this assertion, arguing that a single definition of 
terrorism is necessary in law in order to expose it for what it is: a belligerent 
activity.40 Carr embraces this moral political benefit of having a delegitimising label 
at the disposal of decision-makers:  
It must be [broad], if we are to recognise and expose terrorism in every one of its 
guises and permutations, and thus reveal two truths: first, that terrorism is among 
mankind's most outrageously unacceptable belligerent practices, which include 
piracy, slavery, and genocide; and second, that every people and nation has, at one 
time or another, practiced a form of warlike behaviour that easily fits the definition 
                                                 
37 ibid, 109-110. 
38 ibid 110-111, 115; RR Baxter, ‘A Skeptical Look at the Concept of Terrorism’ (1974) 7 Akron Law 
Review 380, 380.  
39 ibid 111. 
40 Caleb Carr, ‘Why the Definition of Terrorism Must be Broad’ (2007) 24(1) World Policy Journal 47, 
47. 
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cited above. It is only by recognizing such globally generalized responsibility for 
terrorism's development that we can hope to end the cyclical pattern of atrocity, 
accusation, rationalisation, recrimination, and revenge that has allowed the practice 
to remain alive.41 
Thus Carr’s exposing of the delegitimising effect of the ‘terrorist’ label is not done in 
order to give the state a weapon with which it can attach to its political opponents, 
but also to reveal the delegitimising actions of states themselves.  
Carr’s argument assumes that defining what terrorism is can frame our 
understanding and perspectives of it. A similar argument is put forward by Ben Saul 
who contends that a single definition of terrorism in international law is necessary in 
order that the definition can be controlled.42 Golder and Williams, by arguing that 
law should define terrorism so as to circumscribe it within the rule of law and feed 
into public discourse appear to advance this argument of control also.43 Definitions, 
in order to be effective, must exclude certain phenomena from their ambit, thus 
ensuring parameters around concepts and managing its use. A single legal definition 
of terrorism can potentially help shape how the term is used by both national and 
international actors. Indeed, one of the key concerns driving the quest for a 
definition of terrorism in international law is this desire to control its use. Rumyana 
Grozdanova suggests that the litmus test for an effective definition of terrorism in 
international law would be to ‘limit the scope for a political, rather than legal 
determination of what is ‘terrorism’ and who is a ‘terrorist’.44 A single definition of 
terrorism may help to confront this subjective nature of labelling an individual or 
event as terrorist as the labeller is simply applying the legal definition of terrorism to 
the facts at hand. As we shall see below, however, this argument over-estimates the 
capacity of legal terms to ‘frame’ political, public, and media debate surrounding 
terrorist events.45  
                                                 
41 ibid 48. 
42 Ben Saul, ‘Defining “Terrorism” to Protect Human Rights’ in D Staines ed, Interrogating the War on 
Terror: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2007) 190, 210.  
43 Text to n 34 above.  
44 Rumyana Grozdanova, ‘”Terrorism” — Too Elusive a Term for an International Legal Definition?’ 
(2014) 61(3) Netherlands International Law Review 305, 315. 
45 text to n 142 below. 
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The Definition of Terrorism in UK Law 
The quest to provide a single definition of terrorism in the UK finds its origins in the 
recommendations made by Lord Lloyd in his 1996 Inquiry into Legislation against 
Terrorism report.46 Lord Lloyd’s report was produced at a time when the main 
definition of terrorism in UK law was contained in the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 (PTA). Section 14(1) of the PTA 1974 defined 
terrorism as ‘the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence 
for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear.’47 The PTA 
1974, motivated by the conflict in Northern Ireland and in particular the threat posed 
by the IRA, only covered acts of domestic terrorism. Lord Lloyd, concerned by this 
distinction between domestic and international terrorism proposed that any new 
legislation should contain a definition which covered all forms of terrorism. He then 
recognised the difficulties in providing just a single definition of terrorism, noting 
that he was aware of ‘at least four different definitions of terrorism’ in US law.48 
Nevertheless, he then went on to recommend the following definition as used by the 
FBI as a template for which a UK definition could be based upon: 
The use of serious violence against persons or property, or the threat to use such 
violence, to intimidate or coerce a government, the public or any section of the 
public, in order to promote political, social or ideological objectives.49 
The difficulty with using this definition, however, as Clive Walker highlights, is that 
the FBI definition is ‘an administrative construct for jurisdictional, budgetary and 
other administrative purposes. It does not serve as a legal term or art on which 
liberty depends.’50 Lord Lloyd’s report thus does not go into any great detail as to 
why only a single definition of terrorism is needed and does not look at the 
underlying purpose of the FBI definition recommended.  
The definition proffered by Lord Lloyd is decontextualized from the specific 
purpose it was designed for; it is one of a number of different definitions in US law. 
                                                 
46 Lord Lloyd, Inquiry into Legislation against Terrorism: Volume 1 (The Stationary Office 1996) 24-26.  
47 Prevention of Terrorism Act 1974, s14(1). 
48 Lloyd (n 46) 26. 
49 ibid.  
50 Clive Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to The Anti-Terrorism Legislation (Oxford University Press, 2002) 21. 
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These definitions are of varying breadths, particular to the specific purpose of the 
legal source which contains them. Nicholas Perry, criticising this piecemeal, multi-
definitional approach describes this as amounting to an expression of 
inconsistency.51 A single definition, according to Perry, would allow for better 
communication between law enforcement and intelligence agencies thus improving 
the operational efficiency of counter-terrorist powers.52 Again, however, this 
justification is absent from Lord Lloyd’s report. As is consideration of arguments 
similar to Levitt’s discussed above that a multi-definitional approach could be 
deployed ‘in a way that is convenient, neat, and efficient’.53 Instead, Lord Lloyd’s 
report starts at the point at which a general definition should be provided and then 
seeks to expand it to provide a general definition applicable to domestic and 
international terrorism.  
S1 Terrorism Act 2000 
The result of Lord Lloyd’s report was the Terrorism Act 2000 (2000 Act) and the 
definition of terrorism contained in section 1. This was subsequently amended twice 
by Terrorism Act 2006 and the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 and today reads as 
follows:  
1. (1) In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where —  
 (a) the action falls within subsection (2) [outlined below] 
(b) the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international 
governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and 
(c) The use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or 
ideological cause. 
 (2) Action falls within this subsection if it —  
 (a) involves serious violence against a person,  
 (b) involves serious damage to property, 
 (c) endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action,  
                                                 
51 Nicholas J Perry, ‘The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many 
Grails’ (2003-2004) 30(2) Journal of Legislation 249, 269.  
52 ibid 272. 
53 Text to n 37. 
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(d) creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, 
or 
(e) is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system. 
Finally, section 1.1(3) states that:  
The use or threat of action falling within subsection (2) which involves the use of 
firearms or explosives is terrorism whether or not subsection (1)(b) is satisfied. 
The UK’s approach to defining terrorism therefore is a deductive one: it starts out 
with an initial statement and then applies it to a broad array of crimes, inchoate 
offences, police and immigration powers, and as a guide for prosecutorial discretion. 
This definition was itself the subject of a comprehensive review by the then 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation Lord Carlile undertaken at the 
request of the then Home Secretary.54 Lord Carlile identified four alternative 
propositions that could be followed to reform section 1, all of which he rejected. 
First, that no definition of terrorism is needed, nor any special procedures required. 
Second, that a definition is needed but no special procedures and offences required; 
rather, adjustment to the sentencing powers would suffice. Third, that a definition is 
needed, including special procedures and offences but that the definition ought to be 
tighter than at present. Finally, that a definition is needed, including special 
procedures and offences, drawn broadly and to anticipate estimates of future 
terrorism activity.55 What is common to these propositions is that they all assume a 
single definitional approach. Even the first argument that outright rejects the need to 
define terrorism is framed in terms critical of a single definition of terrorism. Thus 
Lord Carlile, like Lord Lloyd before him, exercises no critical analysis of the merits of 
a multi-definitional approach, assuming that the choices are either a single definition 
of terrorism or none at all.  
II. THE SINGLE DEFINITION OF TERRORISM AND THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY 
The UK’s ‘one size fits all’ definition of terrorism, pursued without much thought 
into the actual advantages and disadvantages of a single definitional approach, is 
one of substantial breadth which poses considerable difficulties for the rule of law. 
                                                 
54Lord Carlile, ‘The Definition of Terrorism’ (Cm 7052, March 2007).  
55 ibid 19. 
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This is ironic seeing as one of the primary justifications for a single definition of 
terrorism is that it can provide clarity and certainty in a way that a multi-definitional 
approach cannot.56 Like the notion of terrorism, the rule of law is itself an incredibly 
broad concept, lacking comprehensive agreement as to its scope.57 At a minimum, 
however, the rule of law requires the principle of legality: that law should be ex ante 
promulgated in a clear manner, so that individuals may be certain that their conduct 
is in conformity with it.58 These elements of clarity and certainty are evident in even 
the thinnest conceptions of the rule of law. Clarity and certainty appear in Dicey’s 
formulation of the rule of law,59 and indeed in Carl Schmitt’s conception of law.60 
Thus Schmitt’s argument that states of exception cannot be circumscribed by law 
due to the inability of law to prescribe ex ante the possible conditions that may 
warrant the ushering in of a state of exception is a testament to this. Clarity and 
certainty also have a degree of normative value to them, even if the law that they 
refer to is one that would be abhorrent to most standards of morality or judicial 
cultures today.61  
Section 1’s conformity with the principle of legality was raised by the Supreme 
Court in R v Gul. 62 The defendant in that case had been convicted under section 2 of 
the Terrorism Act 2006 for dissemination of terrorist publications. The defendant 
had uploaded onto YouTube: 
(i) attacks by members of Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other proscribed groups on 
military targets in Chechnya, and on the Coalition forces in Iraq and in Afghanistan, 
                                                 
56 Walter (n 33). 
57 See Brian Tamanaha, On The Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007); P Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical 
Framework’ [1997] Public Law 567 
58 Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969) 74. 
59 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (6th edn, Macmillan and Co., Ltd. 
1902) 183-184. 
60 See Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Schwab G tr, Chicago: 
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(ii) the use of improvised explosive devices (“IEDS”) against Coalition forces, (iii) 
excerpts from “martyrdom videos”, and (iv) clips of attacks on civilians, including 
the 9/11 attack on New York. These videos were accompanied by commentaries 
praising the bravery, and martyrdom, of those carrying out the attacks, and 
encouraging others to emulate them.63 
Whether Gul had uploaded ‘terrorist publications’ thus depended upon whether the 
individuals in the videos in question were engaged in terrorist activity. Gul 
attempted to argue on three separate grounds that the definition of terrorism 
contained in section 1 of the 2000 Act should be read down:  
i. The 2000 Act, like the 2006 Act was intended, at least in part, to give effect to the 
UK’s international treaty obligations and therefore the concept of terrorism in the 
2000 Act should accord to the concept of terrorism in international law which does 
not extend to military acts by a non-state armed group against a state or IGO [Inter-
governmental Organisation].64 
ii. That it would be wrong to read the 2000 and 2006 Acts as criminalising in the UK an 
act abroad, unless that act would be regarded as criminal by international law.65 
iii. As a matter of domestic law, as distinct from international law, some qualifications 
must be read into the very wide words of section 1 of the 2000 Act.66 
The Supreme Court rejected all three arguments. Arguments (i) and (ii) are based on 
international law and were dismissed as imposing any limit on the breadth of s1 
with the Supreme Court concluding that there was no rule that precluded the UK 
from going beyond what was required by international law so long as it did not 
drop below the minimum agreed upon.67 Argument (i) is particularly problematic as 
there is no clear definition of terrorism in international law.68 The disagreement 
regarding the status of freedom-fighters in international law fell far short of a 
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‘general understanding of what terrorism was’ and indeed is the key stumbling 
block for the question for a single definition of terrorism in international law.69  
Argument (iii) instead was based on domestic law, with counsel urging the Court to 
read some qualifications into s1 so as to narrow its breadth. The Government 
submitted that the common sense usage of discretion by the Crown Prosecution 
Service (CPS) could justify in law the breadth of section 1.70 While the Independent 
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation David Anderson (the Independent Reviewer) 
believes that the operation of prosecutorial discretion can mitigate the negative 
effects of the breadth of S1,71 the Supreme Court expressly rejected this in Gul:  
It may well be that any concern which Parliament had about the width of the 
definition of terrorism in section 1(1) was mitigated by the existence of the statutory 
prosecutorial discretion but… we do not regard it as an appropriate reason for giving 
“terrorism” a wide meaning.72 
This lack of clarity leaves an individual uncertain as to whether their actions will be 
retrospectively described as terrorist, leaving a temporal gap between their actions 
and their subsequent labelling as terrorist.73 Thus reliance upon prosecutorial 
discretion, while de facto may alleviate some of the fears regarding the breadth of 
section 1; de jure it is not acceptable. The Supreme Court stated that Parliament had 
essentially abdicated its responsibility to an unelected official of the executive.74  
British courts can legitimately engage in an interpretive exercise that assumes 
Parliament intended to legislate in conformity with fundamental constitutional 
principles such as the rule of law.75 This has resulted in some high profile instances 
where courts have creatively interpreted statutory provisions to what would be in 
the eyes of some commentators the apparent contrary of what Parliament intended.76 
Nevertheless, despite this capacity for courts to vindicate the principle of legality 
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and the strong concerns regarding the reliance on prosecutorial discretion to curtail 
the breadth in section 1, the Supreme Court could find no indication in the words 
laid down by Parliament that they intended anything other than this outcome. As a 
result of Gul, the breadth of section 1 was left untempered.  
While Gul ultimately lost his case, the Supreme Court nevertheless expressed a 
powerful obiter dictum regarding the scope of the definition of terrorism contained in 
section 1: 
While acknowledging that the issue is ultimately one for Parliament, we should 
record our view that the concerns and suggestions about the width of the statutory 
definition of terrorism which Mr Anderson has identified in his two reports merit 
serious consideration. Any legislative narrowing of the definition of “terrorism”, 
with its concomitant reduction in the need for the exercise of discretion under section 
117 of the 2000 Act, is to be welcomed, provided that it is consistent with the public 
protection to which the legislation is directed.77  
The second general point is that the wide definition of “terrorism” does not only give 
rise to concerns in relation to the very broad prosecutorial discretion bestowed by the 
2000 and 2006 Acts, as discussed in paras 36-37 above. The two Acts also grant 
substantial intrusive powers to the police and to immigration officers, including stop 
and search, which depend upon what appears to be a very broad discretion on their 
part. While the need to bestow wide, even intrusive, powers on the police and other 
officers in connection with terrorism is understandable, the fact that the powers are 
so unrestricted and the definition of “terrorism” is so wide means that such powers 
are probably of even more concern than the prosecutorial powers to which the Acts 
give rise.78  
The Definition of Terrorism and the Principle of Legality in ECHR Jurisprudence 
This concern of the Supreme Court regarding the principle of legality in the context 
of stop and search powers is echoed by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR). The principle of legality is expressly enumerated in a number of 
Convention articles requiring that measures which infringe upon qualified rights in 
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order to give effect to a pressing social need must do so in a manner ‘prescribed by 
law’. The prohibition on retrospective criminal punishment, for example, is 
enumerated in Article 7 and is given non-derogable status.79 Article 7 is, however, 
rarely considered by the ECtHR and instead more common challenges to criminal 
offences tend to arise under Article 5 (right to liberty) and Article 6 (right to a fair 
trial).80 Under Article 5(1) of the ECHR, for example, any restriction on liberty must 
be ‘in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law’. An illustrative example of 
this is contained in Article 5(1)(c) of the Convention which permits the lawful arrest 
of a person on the grounds of reasonable suspicion that they have committed and 
offence. ‘Offence’ in this paragraph has an autonomous Convention meaning and so 
the mere fact that a contracting state has labelled a certain provision of its criminal 
law as an ‘offence’ will not be conclusive.81 
 In Brogan v UK, the ECtHR found that the then UK definition of terrorism contained 
in the Prevention of Terrorism Act 1984 (PTA 1984) — the use of violence for 
political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public 
or any section of the public in fear — was ‘well in keeping with the idea of an 
offence.’82  
To corroborate this, the Court in Brogan cited paragraph 196 of its judgment in 
Ireland v UK.83 Paragraph 196, however, merely repeats the phrase ‘well in keeping 
with the idea of an offence’ and cross-cites back to paragraphs 85-88 of itself. 
Paragraphs 85-88 of Ireland v UK do not, however, yield any other authority to 
corroborate this confident assertion that the definition of terrorism in question is 
‘well in keeping with the idea of an offence’. Instead, these paragraphs contain a 
descriptive discussion of the domestic legal provisions relevant to Ireland v UK and 
their origins. Paragraph 85 draws attention to the Terrorists Order which was a 
ministerial order passed by the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in accordance 
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with the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972. The Terrorists Order 
defined terrorism as ‘the use of violence for political ends, [including] any use of 
violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear’; i.e. 
it was the definition that was subsequently contained in the PTA 1984. There is no 
substantive analysis of why this definition is ‘well in keeping with the idea of an 
offence’. At best, Brogan reveals a very thin ‘rule by law’ approach to the meaning of 
‘offence’, with the ECtHR’s reasoning wholly reliant upon the fact that that the law 
in question is enumerated in a statute and ministerial order. There is no substantive 
analysis of the actual text in question and its conformity with the principle of 
legality. The ECtHR therefore has never actually attempted to unpack whether the 
definition of terrorism in the PTA 1984 is ‘well in keeping with the idea of an 
offence’. Instead, it repeats this phrase until it becomes a self-justifying loop.  
A further problem with relying upon paragraph 85 of Ireland v UK as an authority 
for a definition of terrorism being ‘well in keeping with the idea of an offence’ is that 
this case explicitly states that that the Terrorist Order in question was subject to a 
notice of derogation under Article 15 of the ECHR made by the UK government on 
23 January 1973.84 The entire purpose of declaring an emergency and derogating 
from the Convention is to take measures that are ordinarily not permitted under the 
ECHR.85 It is not correct to assert that the Terrorist Order subject to derogation under 
Article 15 is compliant with the ordinary scope Convention as it operates in 
normalcy — when an emergency has not been declared. The authority of Ireland v 
UK pertaining to the definition of terrorism should be ‘quarantined’ to when an 
emergency is declared under Article 15. In Brogan, no such derogation was in 
effect.86 However, even such a restriction is itself overly broad as each emergency 
experienced by a state or by different states may be different and so what may be 
‘proportionate to the exigencies of the situation’ in one emergency may not be so in 
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another. Consequently, the Court’s reliance upon Ireland v UK as an authority for the 
statement that the definition of terrorism contained in the PTA 1984 is, at its most 
generous reading, weak; at worst it is simply mistaken.  
One must, of course, look at the substantive elements of a particular definition to 
assess whether it is ‘well in keeping with the idea of an offence’. In this regard, the 
definition of terrorism in the PTA 1984 is noticeably narrower than that contained in 
s1 of the 2000 Act.87 It referred only to ‘the use of violence for political ends’, 
whereas s1 refers to the ‘use or threat of action’. Action is defined in s1 (2) as 
something which is not necessarily physical violence against a person or property 
but can include an action that puts others at risk or can ‘seriously to interfere with or 
seriously disrupt an electronic system’. Moreover, in Brogan, the offences delineated 
were scheduled offences. The petitioners were charged with the more narrowly 
defined membership of a prescribed organisation as distinct from being involved in 
terrorism more generally.  
In contrast to Brogan, more recent cases suggest that the ECtHR is engaging in closer 
scrutiny of whether state measures taken in the name of national security are 
‘prescribed by law’. In Gillan and Quinton v UK, police stop and search powers under 
section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 were found by the ECtHR to be incompatible 
with the right to privacy in Article 8.88 Such stop and search powers were, according 
to the Court not ‘prescribed by law.’ Finding that the rule of law ‘is inherent in the 
object and purpose of Article 8 and expressly mentioned in the preamble to the 
convention’,89 the Court held that ‘[T]he law must thus be adequately accessible and 
foreseeable, that is, formulated with sufficient precision to enable the individual — if 
need be with appropriate advice — to regulate his conduct.’90 However, while the 
definition of terrorism in Section 1 of the 2000 Act is relevant for the operation of 
section 44 stop and search powers, the judgment of the ECtHR in Gillan did not 
address this issue. Instead, it was specific failures of section 4 that made it fall foul of 
the rule of law. Gillan thus illustrates the difficulties in trying to challenge section 1’s 
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conformity with the principle of legality as courts will tend to home in on the 
specific power or offence in question, rather than the definition of terrorism in the 
abstract. Cases such as Gul, where the particular facts of the case meant that the 
definition’s scope had to be directly addressed will be rare.91  
 
The Principle of Legality and the application of UK Terrorism Legislation 
overseas 
Challenges to the principle of legality by the operation of decision-maker discretion 
are particularly heightened in the context of the application of UK counter-terrorism 
legislation overseas. A state on the domestic level does not have to deal with the geo-
political wrangling of whether there is a distinction between ‘terrorist’ and ‘freedom 
fighter’ and so is free to define terrorism in line with its subjective perspectives on 
the issue. Whether the lack of such a distinction exists in UK domestic law, however, 
depends upon the interpretation of the word ‘government’ in section 1(b) of the 2000 
Act. Section 1(4)(d) defines ‘government’ to mean ‘the government of the United 
Kingdom, a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United 
Kingdom.92  
Despite this clarification, there is still room for interpretation. In R v F, the Court of 
Appeal upheld the Appellant’s conviction for possession of a document or record 
containing information of a kind likely to be useful to a person committing or 
preparing an act of terrorism.93 The material in question included a ‘CD with 
material downloaded from a Jihadist website, containing instructions regarding the 
manufacturing of explosive devices.94 The appellant was also in possession of a 
document detailing how to set up a ‘terrorist cell’.95 The appellant argued, however, 
that he did not intend to attack the UK but instead attack the Libyan government of 
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Muammar Gaddafi. He therefore argued that the meaning of ‘government’ in s1 of 
the 2000 Act should be read compatibly with the ECHR by using the Court’s 
interpretive obligation under s3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 so as to exclude 
dictatorships or military junta.96 The Court of Appeal rejected this argument stating 
that ‘[I]n our judgment the meaning of the phrase — “a country other than the 
United Kingdom” — is plain enough.’ The Court added:  
We can see no reason why, given the random impact of terrorist activities, the 
citizens of Libya should not be protected from such activities by those resident in this 
country in the same way as the inhabitants of Belgium or the Netherlands or the 
Republic of Ireland. More important, we can see nothing in the legislation which 
might support this distinction.97 
 This approach has a number of difficulties attached to it, however; as identified by 
the Court of Appeal:  
What is striking about the language of s1, read as a whole, is its breadth. It does not 
specify that the ambit of its protection is limited to countries abroad with 
governments of any particular type or possessed of what we, with our fortunate 
traditions, would regard as the desirable characteristics of representative 
government. There is no list or schedule or statutory instrument which identifies the 
countries whose governments are included within s1(4)(d) or excluded from 
application of the Act. Finally, the legislation does not exempt nor make an 
exception, nor create a defence for, nor exculpate what some would describe as 
terrorism in a just cause. Such a concept is foreign to the Act. Terrorism is terrorism, 
whatever the motives of the perpetrators.’98  
It was however open to Parliament to decide that because of the evils of terrorism 
and the manifold dangers that terrorist activities create, it should impose a 
prohibition on the residents of this country from participating or seeking to 
participate in terrorist activities, which may have a devastating impact wherever in 
the world they occur.99  
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According to the Court of Appeal, s1 of the 2000 Act makes no distinction between 
terrorist and freedom-fighter. The problem with this approach, however, as 
suggested by Ben Saul, is that it negates any incentive for a non-state belligerent to 
comply with international humanitarian law.100  
 An additional issue not addressed by the Court of Appeal in R v F is the effect of UK 
government recognition of whom the legitimate authority of a state is. R v F was 
decided before UK military intervention in Libya where NATO forces gave military 
support to armed groups seeking to oust the Gaddafi regime. In 2011, UN Security 
Council Resolution 1973 authorised the enforcement of a no-fly zone in Libya for the 
express purposes of protecting civilians.101 This resolution was enforced by NATO 
with the UK playing a major role in ‘Operation Unified Protector’.102 According to 
the literal meaning of Resolution 1973, it did not, however, authorise ‘regime 
change’. While the resolution does state that it authorised ‘all necessary measures,’ 
Olivier Corten and Vaios Koutroulis argue that this cannot be used to justify regime 
change.103 Firstly, while ‘all necessary measures’ has become the standard 
terminology in international law for permitting the use of force, in this instance it 
was followed by the phrases ‘to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under 
threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ and ‘to enforce compliance with the 
ban on flights’. ‘All necessary measures’ therefore was not a carte blanche grant of 
discretion but was clarified to require these measures be directed towards a specific 
objective only.104 This is further corroborated by the general principle in 
international law that there is no norm permitting a state to support an armed rebel 
group in the overthrow of a government, even if that said government was guilty of 
gross human rights violations.105 Finally, General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) 
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which reflects general customary international law affirmed that support to rebels 
falls under the prohibition of the use of force.106 Consequently, Security Council 
Resolution 1973 could not be used as a legal basis for regime change in Libya. 
Despite this strong prohibition against using military support to effect regime 
change in international law, the NATO campaign diverged dramatically from its 
initial objective of enforcing a no-fly zone to one which had the clear purpose of 
effecting a regime change.107 The UK Government therefore gave military support to 
armed groups that would satisfy the UK definition of terrorism. The extra-territorial 
application of section 1 means that individuals fighting for such groups in Libya 
could be guilty of terrorist offences in UK domestic law and thus liable for 
prosecution. During this military campaign, France, the UK and other NATO 
members officially recognised the Libyan Transnational National Council (TNC) as 
the legitimate authority of Libya.108 The recognition of the TNC as the legitimate 
authority of Libya by member of the coalition of the willing did not affect the legality 
under international law of the military support for the rebels; however, whether 
such an argument could influence the interpretation of section 1 is unclear. In 
addition, throughout the conflict, Libyan rebel groups were accused of a number of 
breaches of international humanitarian law.109 Therefore, even if the UK definition of 
terrorism were amended so that it would not cover armed groups that abide by 
international humanitarian law, the Libyan rebels would have failed to satisfy this. 
Prosecutorial Discretion and British combatants in non-international armed conflicts  
R v F, decided in 2007, contains some prophetic statements pertaining to UK 
intervention in non-international conflicts that erupted from the Arab Spring: 
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‘If it were ever permissible to visit terrorist activities on a tyrannical government, 
would that immunity extend to a group seeking by violent means to foist its own 
different but equally undemocratic principles on the country whose tyrant was 
overthrown?’110  
Thus if the UK definition of terrorism were to exclude attacks against, for example, 
the Syrian government of President Bashar al-Assad and the ruling Ba’ath Party, this 
would apply to all those who perpetrated such attacks, including so-called Islamic 
State (ISIS), or their known associates. The complexities and contradictions of this 
approach are numerous. In September 2013, Parliament refused to give consent to 
UK military intervention in Syria against the Assad regime following the alleged use 
of chemical weapons in Ghouta, Syria.111 This intervention would have directly and 
indirectly aided all armed groups opposed to the Assad regime. Each and every one 
of these opposition groups would satisfy the UK domestic definition of terrorism. 
Two years later in December 2015, Parliament affirmed the Government’s request to 
launch airstrikes in Syria, not against the Assad regime but against the so-called 
Islamic State (IS) a terrorist organisation which constitutes an ‘unprecedented threat 
to international peace and security’.112  
The UK officially recognised the ‘Syrian National Coalition’ (SNC) as the country’s 
legitimate government back in 2012; but once again this cannot affect the legality of 
military support for such a rebel grouping according to international law.113 The 
UK’s support for the SNC and other Syrian opposition groups extends beyond 
military (humanitarian) assistance to include ‘over £45 million of non-humanitarian 
aid in response to the Syria conflict. £2 million of this has gone directly to fund the 
SNC.114 An absurd example of this clash between the legal definition of terrorism 
and the political reality is the case of Bherlin Gildo, a Swedish national accused of 
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terrorist activities in Syria; however, the case against him collapsed when it became 
clear that British security and intelligence agencies were supporting the group he 
was affiliated with.115 
This difficulty therefore is not merely one of a political complaint about the 
hypocritical disjuncture between domestic law and the UK government’s practice 
overseas but gives rise to genuine legal difficulties concerning the principle of 
legality in the context of prosecuting British citizens or residents who were 
belligerents in non-international conflicts who have subsequently returned home to 
the UK. When the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) decides to prosecute a person, it 
does so based on whether there is a sufficiently strong case against a person and 
whether it is in the public interest to bring the prosecution forward.116 Under the 
2000 and 2006 acts, the CPS must seek the consent of the Attorney General before 
prosecutions may be brought against individuals for terrorist offences committed 
outside the UK.117 This requirement is in place in order to prevent compromising 
both British and foreign intelligence operations. It may be the case that the CPS, in its 
discretion, is only deciding to prosecute combatants returning to the UK that pose a 
threat to the UK itself. Alternatively, it may take the position that it is in the public 
interest to deter individuals from travelling abroad to fight in armed conflict and so 
may decide to prosecute whether or not the individual poses a threat to the UK. 
Either way, the issue is not settled by the fact that the UK definition of terrorism 
makes no formal distinction between terrorist and freedom fighter. Rather, this 
broad conflation of the two in UK law results in prosecutors, and the Attorney 
General making this decision and exercising vast discretion as they do so.  
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The result is that the current definition of terrorism places too much discretionary 
power on unelected officials and, as stated by R v Gul, is inherently damaging to the 
rule of law and the principle of legality. In effect, the conflation of terrorist and 
freedom fighter has not resulted in the abolition of the distinction between these two 
concepts in Government policy. The moral judgment involved in labelling an act as 
terroristic is still preserved under section 1. The breadth of section 1 means that this 
distinction between legitimate and illegitimate legitimate violence is being made by 
government officials rather than by Parliament.  
III. A MULTI-DEFINITIONAL APPROACH TO TERRORISM? 
Notwithstanding the persuasiveness of arguments discussed that terrorism is no 
more than a social construct amounting to political violence that the observer 
considers to be illegitimate it appears that counter-terrorist legislation is here to stay. 
Indeed, it may be the case that abandoning the concept of terrorism could be more 
damaging to human rights as the powers limited (albeit very broadly) by this 
definition would most likely remain on the statute books in some form. For example, 
while defining terrorism with reference to motive is problematic, this additional 
hurdle that the prosecution or decision-maker must prove or factor into account can 
act as a control on the breath of the power in question.118 The solution therefore that 
this article advocates is a pragmatic one: if we are to include counter-terrorist 
powers and offences in our legal system then the quest for a single definition should 
be abandoned. Instead a multi-definitional approach should be pursued.  
From a rule of law perspective, a multi-definitional approach would have the 
advantage of avoiding the accommodation of the ‘lowest common denominator’ that 
afflicts the single definitional approach. A narrower definition can be used in certain 
instances, thus better protecting human rights and the principle of legality. At the 
same time, a broader definition could apply to legal norms where it is of ‘operational 
necessity’ to do so.  
This more nuanced approach to defining terrorism is arguably already the case at 
present. In addition to section 1, the UK has one other definition of terrorism in the 
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Reinsurance (Acts of Terrorism) Act 1993 which is specifically for the purposes of 
defining terrorism for insurance claims.119 More significantly, recent changes to the 
Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (TPIMA) also depart 
from section 1. In his report on the operation of terrorism legislation in 2013, David 
Anderson responded to government plans to re-introduce relocation orders in 
TPIMs.120 Anderson acknowledged the potential operational necessity of such a 
reintroduction; however, he also suggested that the broad definition of ‘terrorist-
related activity in the TPIMA be revisited, with a view to narrowing it. The Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015 gave effect to the Independent Reviewer’s 
suggestion, reintroducing relocation orders while at the same time narrowing the 
definition of ‘terrorist related activity’ to exclude support or assistance to those who 
are themselves facilitating or encouraging the commission, preparation or instigation 
of acts of terrorism.121  
Miranda v SSHD: Towards a multi-definitional approach? 
One such area in which a narrower definition of terrorism would be beneficial for 
both human rights and the rule of law would be in criminal offences or state powers 
that impact upon freedom of expression. In Miranda v SSHD,122 the applicant was 
detained and questioned at Heathrow airport under paragraph 2(1) of schedule 7 of 
the 2000 Act. Personal items including encrypted storage devices were taken from 
him. The applicant was the spouse of Glenn Greenwald, the journalist who had 
interviewed and subsequently published in The Guardian material leaked by whistle-
blower Edward Snowden regarding the activities of the US National Security 
Association (NSA) and their capacity to access individuals’ digital data.123  
Schedule 7 can be exercised when an examining officer has grounds for suspecting 
that an individual is a ‘terrorist’. ‘Terrorist’ is circularly defined in section 40(1)(b) as 
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being an individual who ‘is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or 
instigation of acts of terrorism.’124 Thus the scope of schedule 7 is necessarily 
dependent upon the definition of terrorism in section 1 of the 2000 Act.  
While there was some dispute as to the purpose of the detention, the Court of 
Appeal, agreeing with the police, held that the purpose was to determine whether 
Miranda was a person falling within section 40(1)(b) of the 2000 Act, i.e. whether he 
was a terrorist under the meaning of the 2000 Act. Focus therefore centred on the 
meaning of section 1. Concerns were raised as to the breadth of this of this definition 
when applied to the publication of material related to terrorism and other 
journalistic activities. This concern is heightened when one, as Laws LJ did at first 
instance, takes a literal approach to its interpretation. Laws LJ accepted the argument 
that: 
…the section 1 definition is ‘capable of covering the publication or threatened 
publication [for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological 
cause] of stolen classified information which, if published, would reveal personal 
details of members of the armed forces or security and intelligence agencies, thereby 
endangering their lives, where that publication or threatened publication is designed 
to influence government policy on the activities of the security and intelligence 
agencies’: section 1(1)(b) and (c), and (2)(c).125 
The appellant argued that this literal interpretation was too broad as: 
It would include activity that is entirely non-violent; is in pursuit of a legitimate and 
mainstream political cause; may “endanger life” by accident; and where the person 
may be “concerned” in such activity wholly accidentally or even without 
knowledge… On this interpretation of “act of terrorism”, section 41 would allow a 
power of arrest, detention and questioning of any person on reasonable grounds to 
suspect that he was accidentally or unknowingly involved in non-violent political 
activity that indirectly, inadvertently and unintentionally happened to endanger 
life.126 
                                                 
124 Terrorism Act 2000, s40(1)(b). 
125 Miranda (n 122) [41]. 
126 ibid [43]. 
29 
 
A number of examples of the absurd application of this over-broad definition were 
given. For example, a junior doctor who erects a sign to protest about Government 
policy towards the NHS but inadvertently erects it in a way that accidentally 
endangers the life of a passer-by.127 The chilling effect that this may have on free 
speech was also stressed by the Appellant and by the Independent Reviewer.128 
Anderson gives the example of the publication of a blog that argues on religious or 
political grounds against the vaccination of children. If this publication were judged 
to create a serious risk to public health and designed to influence the government, 
then it would be classified as a terrorist action.129  
Dyson MR, persuased by these arguments, adopted an alternative approach to the 
interpretation of section 1, arguing that a mental element must be read into section 1 
when it is applied in certain instances. Dyson MR parses the section 1 definition of 
terrorism into three distinct categories of action. The first category is defined 
exclusively by the action itself; the second are actions defined by their consequences; 
and the final is an action defined by reference to its aim. Arguing that a mental 
element is necessary for the first and third categories, Dyson MR concludes that 
although on a literal interpretation it is possible that a mental element is not 
necessary for the second category, it would be an anomaly if Parliament intended it 
to be read as so. Dyson MR therefore concludes that actions defined as terrorist by 
reference to their consequence must require that the individual intended or was 
reckless as to these consequences coming to fruition.130 He therefore argues that:  
On the interpretation which I would adopt, such a blogger would not be a terrorist 
even if his blog were judged to create a serious risk to public health, unless he 
intends his publication to create the risk (or is reckless as to whether his blog will 
have that effect). Likewise, on this interpretation the junior doctors… would not be 
terrorists either.131 
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Ultimately, the Court of Appeal issued a declaration of incompatibility of Schedule 7 
with Article 10 of the ECHR on the grounds that it was not ‘prescribed by law’: 
I accept that these are constraints on the exercise of the power, but in my judgment 
they do not afford effective protection of journalists’ article 10 rights. The central 
concern is that disclosure of journalistic material (whether or not it involves the 
identification of a journalist’s source) undermines the confidentiality that is inherent 
in such material and which is necessary to avoid the chilling effect of disclosure and 
to protect article 10 rights. If journalists and their sources can have no expectation of 
confidentiality, they may decide against providing information on sensitive matters 
of public interest… It is, therefore, of little or no relevance that the schedule 7 powers 
may only be exercised in a confined geographical area or that a person may not be 
detained for longer than nine hours.132 
‘Obvious’ solutions suggested by the court to rectify this incompatibility is ‘some 
form of judicial or other independent and impartial scrutiny conducted in such a 
way as to protect the confidentiality in the material.’133 An alternative approach, and 
one suggested by this article, would be for a narrower definition of terrorism to 
trigger schedule 7 stop and search powers.  
While Dyson MR’s interpretation does rein in somewhat the excesses of section 1, 
concerns, nevertheless, remain. Dyson MR’s second category of terrorist acts is based 
upon their consequences — the endangerment of a person’s life or the creation of a 
serious risk to the health or safety of the public or section of the public.134 In the 
examples given by Dyson MR and the Independent Reviewer, these consequences 
have already occurred and the prosecution is concerned with proving whether the 
individual intended these consequences or was reckless as to whether they would 
come to fruition. However, the primary function of counter-terrorist powers is to 
prevent the consequences in the first instance — to ‘defend further up the field’.135 
The preventative nature of counter-terrorist powers is the driving force behind the 
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breadth of the definition of terrorism.136 Interference with expression can therefore 
happen before publication or before the consequences occur. Journalists or other 
publishers are aware of this. Dyson MR’s narrowing of the definition is thus of 
minimal assistance to the journalist as the ‘chilling effect’ still remains. 
The chilling effect could be avoided by a tighter definition of terrorism to apply 
when the ‘action’ that is seeking to be prevented is a form of written or verbal 
expression, rather than an act of violence. For example, amending ‘influence the 
government’ in section 1(1)(b) to ‘designed to compel, coerce or intimidate’ the 
government.137 This would increase the threshold of what would be considered a 
terrorist publication, thus mitigating the chilling effect by reassuring journalists that 
they have greater freedom to express themselves. The narrowing, however, would 
be limited only to specific offences, thus not hampering the operational necessity of a 
broader definition in circumstances where it is considered necessary.  
By departing from the single definitional approach, clarity could be brought to this 
area by drafting a separate definition of terrorism deal with inchoate offences or 
offences that deal with the publication or dissemination of terrorism. In this way, the 
mental element could be more clearly refined and elucidated in a manner that 
Parliament may have been reluctant to do for all other offences or powers that derive 
from section 1. A multi-definitional approach could be used to design a legislative 
landscape for acts of terrorism committed outside the UK that would avoid, or at 
least reduce, the current reliance upon prosecutorial discretion that currently 
prevents its absurd, and at times hypocritical application.  
 
IV. DEPARTING FROM THE SINGLE DEFINITION: LEGAL VERSUS POLITICAL FRAMES 
A multiple definitional approach to terrorism therefore has significant advantages 
for the rule of law and human rights. As stated previously, however, this approach 
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has been criticised as amounting to an expression of inconsistency.138 Despite this 
concern, the UK’s single definition of terrorism has also not been applied in a 
consistent fashion due to the broad discretion afforded to decision-makers such as 
the CPS. Indeed, the UK government’s actions overseas in Syria and Libya have also 
been inconsistent with this definition. Of course, section 1 was never designed to 
constrain the Government’s actions; however, the argument may still be put that the 
inconsistency demonstrated by a multiple definitional approach may feed into 
public discourse on terrorism and thus reduce law’s ability to influence this 
discussion. A key argument in favour of a single definition of terrorism that has not 
yet been confronted is the idea that by defining terrorism we can control it.139 This 
‘moral-political’ condemnation of political violence can, according to this argument, 
shape the debate and control the use of who or what is labelled a terrorist.140 This 
argument thus conceptualises law and legal definitions as shaping and framing the 
political debate and it is this contention. This argument also, however, overstates 
law’s role in this public discourse. 
Framing Public Discourse on Terrorism  
The subjective nature of the ‘terrorist’ label bestows a considerable power on the 
individual doing the categorising. The British Government’s use of the label 
‘terrorist’ is not the application of the section 1 definition to a given individual or 
their acts; rather, we have seen that this conceptualisation of terrorism deviates 
substantially from the legal definition, incorporating strategic political preferences 
and elements that are absent from section 1. It is this conception of terrorism — not 
the section 1 definition — that shapes and ‘frames’ the subsequent public discourse 
surrounding the nature of terrorism.141  
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According to RM Entman, to frame is ‘to select some aspects of a perceived reality 
and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation for the item described’.142 Jim Kuypers further defines 
framing as: 
…a process whereby communicators, consciously or unconsciously, act to construct a 
point of view that encourages the facts of a given situation to be interpreted by 
others in a particular manner. Frames operate in four key ways: they define 
problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgments, and suggest remedies.143 
Frames thus affect the manner in which individuals perceive and understand events. 
In public discourse, there will be competing frames proffered from various sources. 
Meaning is not found but is created by rhetors and, in this regard, the executive 
above all other branches of government is best-placed to frame a crisis and interpret 
a particular act as terrorist or not.144 This is the case, regardless of whether there 
exists a settled definition of terrorism in law. In the aftermath of a so-called ‘terrorist 
attack’ the media will react by seeking to apply a previously used narrative in order 
to filter information and make sense of the unfolding events.145 Once the frame of 
‘terrorism’ is established it dominates the reporting of the event to the exclusion of 
other competing frames.146 Familiar sources of information will be approached in 
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order to expedite the explanation and this, in turn, facilitates the agenda-setting role 
of the executive.147  
 
Constructing the Political Frame 
Framing theory thus explains how politicians and, in particular, the executive 
construct the public narrative surrounding terrorism; however, it does not explain 
why there is a marked disjuncture between the legal definition of terrorism and the 
image constructed by the political narrative. Defining what constitutes an enemy to 
the state is of fundamental importance to politics, and law enforcement and 
punishment has always been a key feature of sovereign power.148 The decision to 
differentiate friend from enemy is also closely linked to this expression of 
sovereignty.149 This distinction between legitimate and illegitimate political violence 
is not done through law but instead through a process of ‘othering’.150 
Stanley Cohen, in his seminal work on othering and moral panics termed the groups 
that are the subject of these panics ‘folk devils’.151 The ‘otherness’ of these folk devils 
— such as the archetypal terrorist — are reinforced by crude stereo-types based on 
race, religion, and other factors. This folk-devil construct of the archetypal terrorist 
may be strong enough to displace the actual reality of the terrorist threat facing a 
state, both in the minds of the public and political actors. Thus the threat from 
Islamic extremist terrorism is more politically salient than that from dissident Irish 
republicanism, notwithstanding statistical evidence indicating that the latter has 
caused more deaths in the UK in the past five years than the former.152 Indeed, 
Islamic extremist terrorism is such a strong frame that when other forms of terrorism 
do occur, the media is often reluctant to frame the act as terrorism.  Thus the killing 
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of MP Jo Cox in June 2016 by Thomas Mair who allegedly shouted out ‘put Britain 
first’ and gave his name in court as ‘death to traitors, freedom for Britain’ clearly 
satisfied the definition of terrorism; however, there was an appreciable reluctance 
from many media outlets to frame it as such at the time.153 Instead, many outlets 
sought to emphasise Mair’s struggles with mental illness; 154 a factor which others 
convicted of offences related to Islamic extremist terrorism also faced.155 Moreover, 
the framing of Islamic terrorism as a global threat can be utilised to selectively 
conceptualise an attack anywhere in the world as an attack on the UK. A 
Government now does not have to experience first-hand an attack in its state for it to 
be able to invoke the rhetoric of an emergency, arguing that a threat exists which 
justifies exceptional counter-terrorist measures that derogate from human rights and 
the rule of law. Islamic terrorism can thus be conceptualised as a global threat in a 
way that Irish republicanism never could.  
The result of this is that the legal definition of terrorism cannot hope to control the 
use of the term ‘terrorism’ by political actors, the media or the public as a whole. 
Such arguments ignore the powerful functions that frames have in the public 
consciousness and agenda-setting, elevating the law to a lofty status of political 
influence that it simply does not occupy. At most, the legal definition of terrorism 
can only seek to demarcate and control public decision-makers when exercising 
counter-terrorist powers. We have seen, however, that the current broad definition 
of terrorism contained in section 1 of the 2000 Act fails to do even that. This 
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conclusion, while based on an analysis of British domestic law, also has ramifications 
for the necessity of a definition of terrorism in international law.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The UK’s current definition of terrorism contained in section 1 of the TA 2000 has 
worrying implications for the principle of legality and human rights. Moreover, it 
has minimal impact in shaping public and political discourses regarding what 
constitutes terrorism. At most, the legal definition of terrorism can only seek to 
demarcate and control public decision-makers when exercising counter-terrorist 
powers. We have seen, however, that the current broad definition of terrorism 
contained in section 1 of the 2000 Act fails to do even that. Instead, it paves the way 
for the socially constructed terrorist to influence decision-makers. 
Further counter-terrorist or counter-extremist strategies may exacerbate this issue 
further. Recent policy pronouncements from the British Government indicating a 
shift towards tackling ‘extremism’ rather than ‘terrorism’ will potentially increase 
reliance by decision-makers on this social construct. The aim of counter-terrorist 
legislation is distinct from the ordinarily reactive criminal justice system and seeks to 
‘defend further up the field’, preventing attacks from happening in the first 
instance.156 Focusing on ‘extremism’ rather than terrorism will shift this defence even 
further up. The British Government’s ‘Comprehensive Strategy to Defeat Extremism’ 
Defines extremism as:  
The vocal or active opposition to our fundamental values, including democracy, the 
rule of law, individual liberty and the mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths 
and beliefs. We also regard calls for the death of members of our armed forces as 
extremist.157 
Whether this definition of such considerable breadth is transposed into law is 
unclear; nevertheless, any legal definition of extremism will invariably suffer from 
similar accusations of vagueness that plague the s1 definition of terrorism. This in 
turn will result in a huge degree of decision-maker discretion being exercised in 
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order to prevent abuses of counter-extremist powers, again undermining the 
principle of legality that is a fundamental cornerstone of the British Constitution.  
The pragmatic solution that this article suggests is to abandon the single definition of 
terrorism and instead have multiple definitions the breadths of which vary 
according to the particular power exercised. An alternative solution is not a legal one 
but a political one. The UK could act in the conduct of its international affairs in a 
manner consistent with its domestic definition of terrorism. This would entail 
providing no material or financial support to groups that are using armed force 
against the government of specific states. This approach would also be consistent 
with international law which prohibits the support for rebel groups against the 
incumbent government. This approach, however, in blunt terms, is unlikely to be 
realised. The power to distinguish friend from enemy is one that is intimately linked 
with sovereignty and one that governments will be loath to relinquish.158 Even with 
a clear legal definition of terrorism, governments will still deviate from this when it 
is advantageous. This tendency is amplified in the context of the quest for a single 
definition of terrorism in the international setting. If a domestic definition of 
terrorism, agreed upon and shaped by the government cannot control the 
government in its actions, there is little hope for the quest for an international 
definition of terrorism that seeks to control and bind the various disparate 
perspectives on terrorists and freedom fighters in international law. Indeed, it is for 
this reason that Conor Gearty argues that terrorism is far too useful a term for 
governments for it to be controlled.159 It is not the lack of a legal definition of 
terrorism in international law that has resulted in hegemonic powers like the US and 
UK to decide on a case by case basis who is the international public enemy.160 
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